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THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTION UNDER
THE PRICE CONTROL ACT.
Arthur Basse, Jr.*
N EVER in all history has a single section of a statute begotten
such a prodigious amount of litigation as the treble damage
action provision for the enforcement of price control. Nor are
these suits trivial in character. In one instance -a recovery
was sought in the amount of $7,500,000.1 Judged by any stand-
ard, the treble damage action is important. It is the purpose of
this article, therefore, to examine it comprehensively and to eval-
uate it, restricting comment to this single phase of the far-flung
price control program. As statutory analysis is the essence of the
problem, the terms of the original statute,2 as well as those of
the later amendment, 3 must be kept clearly in mind. They become
the basis for any discussion of the issues involved while at the
same time being the starting point for any attempt to evaluate
the operation of the statute.
* Member of Illinois Bar; LL.B., Yale University; M.A. (Econ.), Northwestern
University; B.A., Amherst College.
' Bowles v. American Distilling Co., civil action No. P. 307, U. S. Dist. Ct.. So.
Dist., Ill. The case was submitted to the jury on one issue only, to-wit: did de-
fendant make the sales described in the complaint. The verdict was "yes." By
stipulation, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $200,000 and costs
was entered and subsequently satisfied.
256 Stat. 33; 50 U. S. C. A. App. §925(e).
3 58 Stat. 640; 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(e).
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I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Just as in other fields of law, it is well for the aggrieved
party to bring the treble damage action as soon as possible. An-
ticipatory remedies, such as injunction4 and declaratory judg-
ment,5 are not within the scope of this article so, if they are,
eliminated, the rule that the action should be brought as soon as
the cause of action accrues serves as a good rule of thumb. In
that respect, it has been held that the cause of action accrues as
soon as the consideration is actually paid or a consideration is
given on which the person is unconditionally, absolutely, and
immediately liable, as by the delivery of a negotiable promissory
note into the hands of a third party for value, rather than when
the consideration is contracted for but has not yet been paid.6
But since the terms "sale" and "selling" are statutorily defined
to include contracts to sell or transfer,7 it could be argued that
the cause accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, from
the time the contract is signed especially since the exact instant
when it accrues might be influenced by some particular regula-
tion, order, or price schedule. It should also be remembered that
while all actions should be instituted within one year from the
occurrence of the violation, the buyer who fails to sue within
thirty days after the violation may lose his right if the Admin-
istrator should proceed thereon."
4 See 58 Stat. 640; 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(a). The Administrator may act
to enjoin the eviction of a tenant: Brown v. Wright, 137 F. (2d) 484 (1943);
Henderson v. Fleckinger, 136 F. (2d) 381 (1943). He may couple his request for
injunction with a claim for damage even though the jurisdictional amount is not
present: Bowles v. Franceschini, 145 F. (2d) 510 (1944).
5 A tenant facing eviction at the expiration of a lease may not seek a declaratory
judgment as the jurisdictional amount would be lacking: Hock v. 250 Northern
Ave. Corporation, 142 F. (2d) 435 (1944). The Administrator has taken the posi-
tion that a suit for declaratory judgment, provided it seeks merely for a de-
termination of the meaning of a regulation and is not brought for the purpose
of anticipating an enforcement action, involves no conflict with 50 U. S. C. A.
App. §924 (d).
6 El Paso Furniture Co. v. Gardner, 182 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 818
(1944). For that reason, a complaint alleging that defendant agreed to sell an
automobile to plaintiff at a price in excess of the ceiling, but which did not allege
that plaintiff had actually paid anything, was held insufficient to state a cause of
action: Lowres v. Fergus Motors Inc., 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 478 (1944).
750 U. S. C. A. App. §942(a).
s Ibid., § 925(e).
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The usual rules of pleading and procedure apply to the treble
damage action. As could be expected, courts have varied over the
strictness and fullness of allegation required, shading from in-
sistence upon the specific amount of overcharges, the price sched-
ules relied upon, the dates of sale, and names of purchasers, to
the other extreme of the barest ultimate facts.9 Permitting only
the barest ultimate facts in the pleading rests upon the idea that
most of the information is either within the seller's knowledge,
may readily be obtained by discovery, or may be elicited at a
pretrial conference, so that the defendant need be given only
enough facts to frame a responsible pleading. Facts must be al-
leged, however, to support the allegation that the sales involved
were not made to a person for use or consumption other than in
the course of trade or business, for otherwise the complaint may
be held to fail to state a cause of action even though that bare
allegation, as a conclusion of law, be made. 10 A fortiori, if such
allegation is lacking the complaint states no cause of action,"
as would also be the case if it contained no allegation as to the
amount of the overcharge. 12  Causes of action for injunction and
for damages may be joined in the same complaint and it is not
misjoinder to so do.13 The pleader may, if he wishes, institute
two separate actions for the prior injunctive decree will not con-
stitute res adjudicata or estoppel in the subsequent treble damage
action,' 4 although the defense of estoppel will probably not be
9 The cases vary from Bowles v. Schultz, 54 F. Supp. 708 (1944), and Bowles v.
Yankee Brewing Co., 4 F. R. D. 508 (1945), strict decisions; through Bowles v.
National Erie Corporation, 3 F. R. D. 469 (1944), fairly strict; Bowles v. Karl).
3 F. R. D. 327 (1944), about midway; to Bowles v. Liebman, 1 C. C. H. Price
Control 51,150, fairly liberal; Bowles v. Cook Cheese Co., 1 C. C. H. Price
Control 51,172, very liberal; and Bowles v. Ex. 1 C. C. H. Price Control 52,038,
extremely liberal. No allegation that the suit is authorized by General Order
No. 3 of the OPA is necessary if the complaint is signed by attorneys admitted
to practice in the court in which the suit is filed: Bowles v. American Brewery.
146 F. (2d) 842 (1945). On the other hand, it was at first erroneously held that
the Administrator must allege specific approval by the Secretary of Agriculture
in actions based on overceiling sales of agricultural products: Bowles v. Strick-
land, 55 F. Supp. 132 (1944), reversed in 151 F. (2d) 419 (1945).
'0)Bowles v. Cabot, 59 F. Supp. 855 (1945), reversed in 153 F. (2d) 258 (1946).
11 Dolan v. Smith, 13 Conn. Supp. 459 (1945); Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N. Y.
492, 58 N. E. (2d) 508 (1944).
12 In Bowles v. Fode, 2 C. C. H. Price Control 52,311 (D. C., No. Dak., 1945),
such a complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
13 Bowles v. National Erie Corporation, 3 F. R. D. 469 (1944).
14 Bowles v. Capitol Packing Co., 143 F. (2d) 87 (1944).
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stricken on a simple motion. 5 While a judgment for the plaintiff
on the pleadings could be granted under the section prior to its
amendment, 16 that result appears unlikely in most cases under
the present section 17 for the reason that the court has been granted
a wider discretion which may be exercised to better advantage
when evidence is presented. The treble damage section may also
prove a valuable defensive device. By way of counterclaim, in
a seller's action for the price, the buyer may ask treble the
amount by which the consideration exceeds the maximum price
prescribed by the schedule,' provided the transaction did not
occur between merchants or tradesmen. The failure of the seller
to comply with the applicable maximum price regulation may
prove a successful defense, upon the ground of illegality, to his
claim for recovery for goods sold and delivered. 19
While the jurisdictional provision of the statute directs that
the action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction,
it does not in any way override the statutory provision that all
such actions must be brought in the district or county in which
the defendant (1) resides, or (2) has a place of business, (3) an
office, or (4) an agent.20  It is true that venue is a personal privi-
lege which may be waived, as by a general appearance, by filing
an affidavit or defense to the merits, or by failure to make sea-
sonable objection, 2' but if not waived, the action must be brought
in one of the four specified places. 22  The mandatory character
15 Bowles v. Bissinger & Co., 3 F. R. D. 494 (1944).
16 Bowles v. Vinson, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,113 (D. C., N. M., 1943).
17 Bowles v. Pelkin, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,409 (S. D., N. Y., 1945). A gen-
eral denial answer is not sufficient to prevent summary judgment where the ex-
hibits and affidavits attached to the complaint go unchallenged and show no
substantial question for determination: Schreffmer v. Bowles, 153 F. (2d) 1 (1946).
On request for admissions, pursuant to Rule 36 of -the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendant must specifically deny the matters on which admission is
sought or will be held to have admitted the same so as to permit summary judg-
ment: Bowles v. Batson, 61 F. Supp. 839 (1945).
18 Hake v. Glenn, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 50,934 (N. Y., 1943). Morgan Sash
& Door Co. v. Cullen Lumber Co., 195 Okla. 448, 159 P. (2d) 233 (1945), denied
recovery to a merchant buying for resale.
19 Heilbroner v. Wagner, 185 Misc. 537, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 434 (1945).
20 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(c).
21 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153. 84
L. Ed. 167 (1939); Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208, 47 S. Ct.
578, 71 L. Ed. 1002 (1927).
22 Martocci v. Diorio, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 52,081 (Pa. Com. Pleas, 1944).
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of the provision is emphasized by the deletion of the words
"wherever the defendant may be found" from the provisory
clause in the amended statute, 23 which governs treble damage ac-
tions. It takes a rare case indeed to raise any question of venue
in the light of these broad provisions as "office" and "place of
business" are not synonymous. A selling agent who works for
several concerns still conducts an "office" of the concern which
compensates him even though it might not be regarded as that
concern's "place of business." While a foreign corporation may
not be "doing business" within a district so as to be "found"
therein, it may nevertheless be deemed to be transacting business
there so as to make the venue proper. 24 Moreover, only part of
the act or transaction alleged to violate the section need take
place within the district where suit is brought.25
As always, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a violation
by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, whether the over-
charge be for rent,26 a service, 27 or in connection with the trans-
fer of personal property.28  The evidence must be such as to
enable the court to resolve the truth of the matter, and the plain-
tiff must, of course, clearly bring himself within the terms of the
section. Thus, if the suit is brought by a buyer, he must prove
that the articles were purchased for use or consumption other
than in the course of trade or business, 29 and when he challenges
a sale as being above the ceiling price he has the burden of prov-
ing what the ceiling price isA0  The burden may, however, shift
to the defendant, particularly if he wishes to take advantage of
the proviso clause in the amended statute to limit his liability,
23 Compare 56 Stat. 33 with 58 Stat. 640.
24 Bowles v. Edward Mfg. Co., 57 F. Supp. 887 (1944).
25 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(c). But see Bowles v. Beucher, 53 F. Supp. 984
(1944).
26 Egling v. Lombardo, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 805 (1944). In Kessler v. Grasser, 300
Ky. 89, 187 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1945), however, the tenant was denied a recovery
for alleged excessive rentals paid under a lease of property to be used as a
"residence, storeroom and workshop" because the rent regulation applied only
to residential property.
27 Alpert v. Greenlee, - Ida. -, 148 P. (2d) 777 (1944).
28 Dunakin v. Southwestern Consumers Co-op Ass'n, 49 N. M. 69, 157 P. (2d)
243 (1945); Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N. Y. 492, 58 N. E. (2d) 508 (1944).
29 Ibid. See also Marrow Mfg. Corp. v. Eitinger, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 11 (1945).
30 Bowles v. Gulf Refining Co., 61 F. Supp. 149 (1945).
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for he will then have the burden of proving non-wilfulness and
the exercise of practicable precautions. 31
Since the treble damage action is based on a statute, the right
to sue cannot be qualified by any provision in the lease or other
contract purporting to waive the right or any of the incidental
rights connected therewith, such as the right to trial by jury. 2
And, because the statutory remedy is exclusive, a tenant may not
minimize the statutory liability by suing for mere reimbursement,
at least under the unamended section.33  A conflict has arisen,
however, under Section 205(a) of the statute, permitting the Ad-
ministrator to sue for an "injunction, restraining order, or other
order," as to whether or not the three last quoted words empower
the court to order restitution or whether the treble damage action
is the exclusive remedy for the recovery of money.3 4  But the
statutory remedies are not so exclusive as to bar a buyer from
maintaining an ordinary action for fraud in a case where the ele-
ments of such an action exist,3 5 so other civil remedies may be
utilized.36  It would also appear to be theoretically impossible to
compromise the treble damage action, but in actual practice a
large number of cases have been compromised, even with judicial
approval. 37
One more preliminary point may be noted. The stay afforded
31 See cases cited In notes 80 and 81, post.
32 Frieson v. Almin Realty Corporation, 184 Misc. 346, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 243
(1945).
33 Moore v. Coates, 40 A. (2d) (Mun. Ct., D. C.) 68 (1944). Compare, since
the amendment, "Cimie" v. Caldwell, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,444 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1945), with Marrow Mfg. Corp. v. Eitinger, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 11 (1945).
34 Compare Bowles v. Warner Holding Co., 60 F. Supp. 513 (1944), affirmed in
151 F. (2d) 529 (1945),.with Office of Price Administration v. Georgian Hotel
Co., 60 .P. Supp. 155 (1945), and Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F. (2d) 817 (1945), re-
versing 59 F. Supp. 4 (1945).
35 Southwest Lead & Zinc Co. v. Fox, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 52,013 (Cal.
Sup. 1944).
36 The seller, on the other hand, may not avoid a contract entered into in ex-
cess of the ceiling price and will be denied the right to repossess the property:
El Paso Furniture Co. v. Gardner, 182 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 818 (1944).
But compare with Morgan Ice Co. v. Barfield, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,514
(Tex. Civ. App., 1945), where the promisee of a contract to buy ice at over
ceiling prices was not allowed to recover because the contract was illegal.
37 See, for example, In re Maier Brewing Co., 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,132
(S. D., Cal., 1944). The court there indicated that neither the estate of the
corporate debtor nor the trustee should be subjected to the financial risk of treble
damages where there was controversy as to liability. See also the action taken
in case cited in note 1, ante.
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by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act"8 is applicable even
to this urgent price control action, but if there are two defend-
ants and one of them is not protected by the provisions of that
act, the action may proceed as against him without reference to
the liability of the other.3 9
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Act, in very sweeping language, precludes all courts ex-
cept the Emergency Court of Appeals from passing upon the
constitutionality of any regulation, order, or price schedule, and
from staying or enjoining any provision of the Act authorizing
the issuance thereof.40 Now that the United States Supreme
Court has held the general scheme of the statute to be constitu-
tional,41 the problem of constitutionality has been greatly nar-
rowed.
One point of contention is that the Administrator violates
rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when
procuring data to be the basis of the subsequent suit. As the
statute requires persons engaged in business to keep records and
to permit inspection thereof by the Administrator,42 the courts
have held that these Amendments do not inhibit the Adminis-
trator's action,43 on the theory that such records are regarded
as quasi-public, hence automatically open to the Administrator.44
38 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 521 and 524.
39McFadden v. Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8 (1945).
4050 U. S. C. A. App. § 924(d).
41 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944):
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944). On the
subject of constitutionality in general, see Sprecher "Price Control in the Courts,"
44 Col. L. Rev. 34 (1944), particularly pp. 37-42, and note in 12 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 414.
42 50 U. S. C. A. App. §922(b).
43 Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F. (2d) 774 (1944), reversing 56 F.
Supp. 805 (1944); Bowles v. Amato, 60 F. Supp. 361 (1945); Bowles v. Kirk.
59 F. Supp. 97 (1945); Bowles v. Stitzinger, 59 F. Supp. 94 (1945); Bowles v.
Curtiss Candy Co., 55 F. Supp. 527 (1944) ; Bowles v. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co.,
55 F. Supp. 9 (1944); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (1944). If the papers,
documents, etc., are sought by subpoena, the Administrator may have to show the
relevancy thereof before defendant will be ordered to produce them: Bowles v.
Cherokee Textile Mills, 61 F. Supp. 584 (1945).
44 A discussion of this theory may be found in Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber
Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (1945), particularly pp. 570-1. See also Bowles v. Northwest
Poultry & Dairy Products Co., 153 F. (2d) 32 (1946).
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Attack has also been made on the ground that the penalties
recoverable are so severe', oppressive, and unreasonable as to
deprive the seller of his property without due process of law as
well as constituting an unusual punishment in contravention of
the Eighth Amendment. Illustrative of this argument is the Con-
necticut case of Walsh v. Gurman45 where thirty-eight over-
charges of $1.00 each led to a judgment, under the unamended
section, for $1900. Certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court, however, possibly on the theory that the amended
section empowers the court, in future cases, to mitigate hard-
ships of that type.46 It has been held that the recovery of a rela-
tively large amount for a small overcharge is not a violation of
the constitutional mandate that excessive fines may not be im-
posed,4 7 nor does the recovery operate to deprive the defendant
of property without due process as he is given reasonable oppor-
tunity to contest the validity of any regulation promulgated by
the Administrator.48  The fact that authority is in the Adminis-
trator to sue in some cases while the buyer sues in others, has
been held not to constitute an unreasonable and therefore an
unconstitutional classification, 49 nor as amounting to an uncon-
stitutional attempt to enrich the United States Treasury" at the
instance of one who has sustained no damage.51
Whether a defendant may claim a privilege against self-
incrimination has received conflicting answers by the courts, 52
but it would seem that the privilege should not apply5" any more
45 132 Conn. 58, 42 A. (2d) 362 (1945), cert. den. sub nom. Gurman v. i1g, -
U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 24, 90 L. Ed. 35 (1945).
46 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(e) (1).
47 Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 38 A. (2d) 592 (1944).
48 Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F. (2d) 597 (1945), cert. den. - U. S.
-, 66 S. Ct. 484, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 338 (1946).
49 Ibid. See also Augustine v. Bowles, 149 F. (2d) 93 (1945); Bowles v.
American Brewery, 146 F. (2d) 842 (1945).
50 Speten v. Bowles, 146 F. (2d) 602 (1945), cert. den. 324 U. S. 877, 65 S. Ct.
1023, 89 L. Ed. 1429 (1945).
-1Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F. (2d) 597 (1945), cert. den. - U. S.
-, 66 S. Ct. 484, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 338 (1946).
52 Compare Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp. 94 (1944), with Bowles v. Trow-
bridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (1945).
53 This view finds some support in Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F.
(2d) 774 (1944), reversing 56 F. Supp. 805 (1944).
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than would the prohibition against double jeopardy. 54  The
Seventh Amendment, requiring jury trial where the amount in-
volved exceeds $20, has been held insufficient to prevent a city
court from exercising jurisdiction in such actions if no provision
exists for a jury trial therein.5 5 So it would seem well nigh cer-
tain that the treble damage action is constitutional, and counsel
would do well to direct their efforts, outside of the Emergency
Court of Appeals, to facts and legal arguments other than those
bottomed on constitutional grounds.
III. WHO MAY INSTITUTE SUIT
As the statute was originally written, either the buyer who
bought for use or consumption other than in the course of trade
or business or the Administrator was authorized to sue. There
was no overlapping, hence both could not sue.56 By the sub-
sequent amendment, the Administrator 57 is authorized to sue
where the buyer could have sued but fails to do so within thirty
days.
That amendment was probably enacted because Congress
realized that there were too many isolated transactions where
buyers declined to take advantage of their rights, 58 but it has
been productive of confusion for it leaves an ambiguity as to
what is necessary to constitute one a buyer "for use or consump-
tion other than in the course of trade or business." Clearly,
where a retailer sells to a purchaser for use or consumption,
i. e. the typical over-the-counter purchase by the general public,
the buyer may sue and, prior to the amendment, the Adminis-
54 Bowles v. Hoffman, 61 F. Supp. 137 (1945).
55 Whatley v. Love, (La. App.) 13 So. (2d) 719 (1943).
56 Bowles v. Rock, 55 F. Supp. 865 (1944) ; Bowles v. Curtiss Candy Co., 55 F.
Supp. 527 (1944); Alba Trading Co. v. Constants, 181 Misc. 778, 47 N. Y. S.
(2d) 138 (1944).
57 The Administrator may sue in person or may designate an authorized repre-
sentative to bring suit; Bowles v. Wheeler, 152 F. (2d) 34 (1945), cert. den. -
U. S. -. 66 S. Ct. 265, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 183 (1945). The suit need not be
brought in the name of the United States: Bowles v. West. 63 F. Supp. 745 (1946).
58Bowles v. Skaggs, 59 F. Supp. 4 (1945), reversed in 151 F. (2d) 817 (1945).
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trator might not.-9 But where a wholesaler sells to a retailer
who purchases for resale rather than for use or consumption,
such retailer lacks authority to institute suit as the right of ac-
tion in such case is vested in the Administrator.""
The rationale behind this distinction was obviously to enlist
the ultimate consumer, who could not keep informed as to the
ceiling prices of countless articles, in the battle against inflation.
The Act made it worth his while to be an active agent in enforcing
the law. On the other hand, merchants and dealers, trading with
each other, were better able to keep informed and did not need
to engage in inter-commercial litigation. In the latter situations,
the Administrator was given the exclusive right to sue, especially
as he had the licensing authority under the act and could, through
the record-keeping requirements, readily assemble data for en-
forcementA1
One early interpretation of the law would have limited the
Administrator's right to suits against black-market operators,
bootleggers and others not regularly engaged in business. 62 It
was, fortunately, promptly repudiated,63 and has virtually dis-
appeared from the books largely because it takes considerable re-
wording of the statute to arrive at such a meaning.
More serious was the trouble that arose in cases where the
article purchased fell in the category of capital goods, such as
an agricultural combine or a mining" machine. A serious and
irreconcilable split of authority developed. One line of cases held
that the phrase "other than in the course of trade or business"
qualified the words "the person who buys such commodity," so
that, if the purchase was made other than in the course of trade
59 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 59 F. Supp. 751 (1944), affirmed in 145
F. (2d) 482 (1944), reversed on other grounds in 325 U. S. 410, 65 S. Ct. 1215.
89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945); Provisional Government of French Republic v. Cabot, 59
F. Supp. 855 (1945). A companion action to the latter case was reversed in 153
F. (2d) 258 (1946).
1o Bowles v. Francheschini, 145 F. (2d) 510 (1944); Bowles v. Sunshine Pack-
ing Corp., 59 F. Supp. 164 (1945) ; Bowles v. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co., 55 F.
Supp. 9 (1944); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (1944); Morgan Sash & Door
Co. v. Cullen Lumber Co., 195 Okla. 448, 159 P. (2d) 233 (1945).
61 Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (1944).
62 Brown v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 52 F. Supp. 913 (1943).
63 Ibid., reversed in 146 F. (2d) 566 (1945), cert. den. 325 U. S. 877, 65 S. Ct.
1554, 89 L. Ed. 1994 (1945).
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or business, the purchaser had the exclusive right of action.64
The other line of cases adopted the view of the Administrator to
the effect that the phrase "other than in the course of trade or
business" qualified the prior phrase "for use or consumption,"
so that it was only in those cases where the use of the purchased
article was not in the trade or business of the purchaser that the
purchaser had the right of action.65 Following this view, if a
man bought a truck, not for resale but for use in his own busi-
ness, he was not empowered to sue for treble damages.6 6 While
the interpretation gives meaning to all the words of the statute,
especially the word "consumption" for the truck would be used
up in the trade or business, and does not ignore a single word,
yet it does result in limiting the class of those who can sue in
their own right to purchasers of food, dress, household articles,
and similar products. The opposite view, by contrast, is much
broader for it regards only those buyers as disentitled to sue
who are dealers in the commodity in question, i. e. those who buy
for resale. Under this interpretation, a farmer who buys a trac-
tor is not precluded from suing for treble damages, even though
he uses it in the business of farming, for he does not buy it in
the course of the trade or business of dealing and trading in
tractors.
In attempting to decide which view is correct, legislative
history and judicial precedent are important, but as support for
both views may be found in the legislative history of the statute,
67
64 Bowles v. Madl, 60 F. Supp. 152 (1945). A number of other district courts
were in accord but their decisions were subsequently reversed: see cases cited
in note 65, post. The Madl case was also subsequently reversed in 153 F. (2d)
21 (1945).
65 Bowles v. Whayne, 152 F. (2d) 375 (1945), reversing 60 F. Supp. 78 (1945);
Bowles v. Rogers, 149 F. (2d) 1010 (1945), reversing 57 F. Supp. 987 (1944);
Bowles v. Heinel Motors, Inc., 149 F. (2d) 815 (1945), affirming 59 F. Supp. 759
(1944); Speten v. Bowles, 146 F. (2d) 602 (1945); Bowles v. Silverman, 57 F.
Supp. 990 (1944), appeal dismissed 145 F. (2d) 1022 (1944) ; Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 145 F. (2d) 482 (1944), affirming 59 F. Supp. 751 (1944), but
reversed on other grounds in 325 U. S. 410, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945) ;
Bowles v. Rock, 55 F. Supp. 865 (1944); Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N. Y. 492, 58
N. E. (2d) 508 (1944), reversing 267 App. Div. 603, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 711 (1944).
66 Bowles v. Heinel Motors, Inc., 149 F. (2d) 815 (1945), affirming 59 F. Supp.
759 (1944).
67 For the view that every purchaser, except the purchaser for resale, may sue:
Sen. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. Part IV thereof explains that: "If a
buyer, whose seller has violated a maximum price regulation or price schedule, is
not entitled to bring such action, because he is a buyer in the course of trade or
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the former is not decisive. The Administrator, charged with the
duty of administering the act, has officially interpreted the phrase
"in the course of trade or business" as applying to purchases
by industrial and commercial consumers as well as to purchases
for resale,6s and his interpretation is entitled to great weight.6 9
The preponderance of judicial authority now decidedly supports
that interpretation. TO But the strongest argument of all lies in
the fact that the words "in the course of trade or business"
follow, and therefore qualify, the words "use or consumption,"
rather than the word "buys." Congress, not the courts, should
re-write the statute if it is to be re-written.
From a practical viewpoint, the 1944 amendment has par-
tially solved this controversy in recognizing the Administrator's
right to sue if the buyer could have but does not sue within thirty
days71 as well as in cases where, for any reason, the buyer may
not.72 However, the question may still be important in some in-
stances, particularly to a buyer who is forced to decide whether
the act authorizes him to institute suit.
It should also be remembered that the act prevents double
prosecution for it bars the buyer from taking action if the Ad-
ministrator has instituted suit on the same violation.7 3  More-
over, the amended act provides that a judgment for damages
business, or for other reasons, the Administrator may bring such action on behalf
of the United States." The view that a purchaser may not sue, even if he is the
ultimate consumer, if he buys for use or consumption in his business, is borne out
by Hearings before Senate Banking Committee on Price Control Bill, H. R. 5990,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 141, as well as by the testimony of David Ginsburg at
p. 216. The only purchasers empowered to sue in their own right were "non-
commercial consumers," according to Conference Report on the Price Control
Bill, H. R. 1658, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 26, or "the housewife, in effect,"
according to Hearings before Senate Banking Committee on Price Control Bill.
op. cit.. p. 141. See also S. R. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8, and 88 Cong.
Rec. 664.
68 C. C. H. War Law Service, Price Control, 42,402.16.
69 United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534 at 549, 60 S.
Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345 at 1354 (1940).
70 See cases cited in note 65, ante.
71 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(e).
72 Ibid. It was held. in Bowles v. Liberto, 2 C. C. H. Price Control 52,210
(City Ct., Baltimore, Md., 1945), that where OPA agents, using funds of the
United States, made small purchases at prices in excess of ceiling, the Admin-
istrator was entitled to sue because the buyers were "not entitled . . . to bring
the action."
7350 U. S. C. A. App. §925(e).
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under Section 205(e) bars recovery of damages in any other
action against the same seller on account of sales made to the
same buyer prior to the institution of the action in which such
judgment is rendered.74  As a consequence, the individual buyer,
3ontemplating suit, should investigate to see if any action is
already pending on the same violation and, if not, should make
his suit sufficiently inclusive to cover all demands to date.
IV. WHO IS LIABLE TO SUIT
The statute declares that any person selling a commodity in
excess of ceiling price is liable, while at the same time providing
that the payment or receipt of rent for defense-area housing
accommodations shall be deemed the buying or selling of a com-
modity. The broad statutory definitions given to such words as
''person," "selling," "sale," "commodity," and the like,75 make
the statute so comprehensive as to include virtually every trans-
action. Any question as to who is liable for a violation thereof,
as a consequence, is narrowed to the point where the words "any
person" become crucial in fixing that liability.
A literal interpretation of these words would lead to the
conclusion that every person who sells in violation of an OPA
regulation is liable, regardless of his position as automaton,
servant, agent, and the like, or his lack of control or responsibility
for his action. While it is conceivable that this is what the statute
means, it hardly seems that it must necessarily be so construed.
In fact, one court has brushed off such an argument with the flat
statement that the agent who handles the collection of the ex-
cessive rent is not liable. 76 But the orthodox and usual situation
is presented in Dorsey v. Martin,77 where the court squarely held
74 Ibid. The buyer should also observe the one-year period of limitation: Bowles
v. Babar, 54 F. Supp. 453 (1944) ; Schwartz v. Dell'osso, 23 N. J. Misc. 151, 42 A.
(2d) 306 (1945).
75 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 942.
76 McCowen v. Dumont, 54 F. Supp. 749 (1944). That holding, perhaps, should
be confined to the unusual facts found therein. The landlord-principal was an
invalid, probably a mental incompetent, and her son, who acted as her agent in
collecting the rent, was a plumber by trade. The situation is not comparable
to the ordinary managing rental agent.
77 58 F. Supp. 722 (1945).
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that liability could not be escaped on the ground that the person
collecting the rent was only an agent. The court found support
for that view not only in the statute but also in the Adminis-
trator's rent regulation which defined "landlord" as including
an agent. This additional reliance should not be regarded as too
significant in view of the strong language used, for the court
stated:
Unquestionably it was intended that the agent who violated
the Act should be liable. As a practical matter, the agent
may be even more guilty than the owner. The business of
renting is often placed in the hands of the agent, and the
owner may not even know of the violation. The agent can
hardly plead ignorance because he is in a position to learn
the truth merely by getting in touch with the local Office of
Price Administration.7
Subsequent holdings confirm this conclusion, 79 although there is
some conflict of authority on the subject.80
Although the two views are not harmonious in principle, they
are understandable in terms of their particular facts and circum-
stances. It would appear likely, therefore, that the factual back-
ground will influence the result. For example, a clerk who marks
a package in excess of the ceiling price at the behest and under
the specific direction of the store owner or manager is hardly
likely to be held liable inasmuch as a court would probably hold
the owner or manager, who ordered the act done, responsible for
the violation. While the clerk could technically be regarded as
liable, ethical and practical reasons would direct that he be ab-
solved. On the other hand, if the branch manager of a used car
lot, despite directions of the corporate employer, located in a
distant city, to comply strictly with ceiling prices, should violate
such orders and, in careless disregard of established prices, sell
78 58 F. Supp. 722 at 723.
79 Kurland v. Bukspan, 184 Misc. 590, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 135 (1945); Cha-Kir
Realty Corporation v. Sanchez, 183 Misc. 427, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 482 (1944), both
hold the principal and agent liable.
so In Husers v. Papania, (La. App.) 22 So. (2d) 755 (1945), the agent was held
not liable on the ground that "representative" was taken to mean a legal succes-
sor, such as guardian, executor or the like, rather than one appointed by private
contract.
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a car in excess of the ceiling price, it would seem that the man-
ager might well be held to personal liability. Although the owner
or corporate employer might not escape liability,8' such factual
background might well induce a court to construe the words "any
person" in a manner appropriate to the situation. It would seem
important, therefore, that the particular facts should be alleged
upon which to found liability.
In that respect, it has been held that an attorney-in-fact who
was charged with managing the business at all times during the
alleged violations might be made a defendant,8 2 as could also a
partner, whether doing business in person or by agent. 88  On the
point as to whether corporate officers and directors, as well as
the corporation, might be made defendants, the rule prior to
amendment of the statute was that they could be so named provided
the complaint alleged that they acted as representatives of the
corporation in the sale and delivery of the goods in question.
84
A recent decision construing the amended statute, however, holds
that such officers and directors should not be joined as defend-
ants for the reason that only the "seller" is liable, thereby differ-
entiating between the corporate seller and the salesmen. 5 While
the court conceded that a strong argument could be made in favor
of holding the officers of the corporation personally liable, par-
ticularly where the corporation had become financially unable to
respond in damages, and likewise admitted that a closely-held
corporation might be used as a shield to protect the real owners
from personal liability, it expressed the opinion that the matter
was one for Congressional consideration. In any event, a mere
general allegation that a person has participated actively in the
s It was held to be no defense, in Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.. 386
Ill. 284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944), that the sales were made by the agents of the
corporate defendant without its prior knowledge or subsequent approval.
82 Bowles v. Lecht, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,988 (D. C., R. I., 1944).
83 Jung v. Bowles, 152 F. (2d) 726 (1946).
84 Brown v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation, 53 F. Supp. 659 (1944). Whether
they actually so participated is, of course, a question of fact to be resolved at the
trial: Bowles v. Yankee Brewing Co., 62 F. Supp. 588 (1945).
s5 Bowles v. Cardinal Cutlery Corp., 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,507 (S. D..
N. Y., 1946).
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business of a corporate defendant is not enough to warrant hold-
ing him to liability under the statute.8 6
Responsibility of the principal, of course, would rest on gen-
erally accepted doctrines of agency law.8 There is one case,"'
however, which excused the principal from liability on the ques-
tionable rationale that the doctrine of respondeat superior did
not apply because the action was penal in character. 89 The facts
of that case indicate that the defendant became owner of the
premises just prior to an overcharge of rent, but it did not appear
that he had directed any increase, had engaged the person making
the excessive charge, or had ever received the same. The holding
might be explained in the light of these circumstances. It does,
at least, serve to illustrate that the background might well make
a difference on the question of liability to suit.
V. NATURE OF THE ACTION
Lawyers and judges tend to think of legal theories in terms
of crystallized categories, and the terms "penal" and "remedial,"
when applied to statutes, have come to have some "meaning" if
that word imports familiarity although their exact significance
may not be apparent in a particular situation. While there is
nothing positively wrong in building a rationale on such con-
cepts, it would seem that, as applied to Section 205(e) and the
action thereunder, it has been overdone.
The whole discussion of whether the action is penal or remedial
appears to have been started as a means of attempting to block
suits brought in state courts. In Childs v. Cruise,90 for example,
86Bowles v. Brookside Distilling Products Corp., e0 F. Supp. 16 (1945). But
see Bowles v. Yankee Brewing Co., 62 F. Supp. 588 (1945).
87 Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Il. 284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944).
s Zuest v. Ingra, 132 N. J. L. 37, 38 A. (2d) 457 (1944), affirmed in - N. J. L.
-, 45 A. (2d) 810 (1946).
89 Such rationale appears objectionable not only because it does not give full
force to the Act, but also because it flies in the face of a prior determination of
the same court to the effect that the action was remedial and not penal: Beasley
v. Gottlieb, 131 N. J. L. 117, 35 A. (2d) 49 (1943). That case and similar holdings
were repudiated in Zuest v. Ingra, - N. J. L. -, 45 A. (2d) 810 (1946), when
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals concluded that the Act was penal in
character.
901 C. C. H. Price Control 50,939 (Cal. Sup., 1943).
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plaintiff sued to recover $50 for an alleged overcharge of thirteen
cents, and the California court held that the motion to dismiss
should be sustained because "it has been the rule that the courts
of one sovereignty would not enforce the penal laws of another
sovereignty or entertain actions for penalties based on or arising
out of their laws." Another court in the same state indicated
that Congress could "not compel the state courts to act as penal
enforcement agents of the United States," but when mandamus
proceedings were instituted to force it to hear and determine the
cause, the writ was issued on the ground that a state court must
assume jurisdiction of an action created by federal law, regard-
less of whether or not that action be considered either as penal
or as "furthering the governmental interest." 91
Other courts, as a means toward finding that they possessed
jurisdiction, have labelled the action "remedial," although a va-
riety of reasons have been given to justify that classification.92
It has been said that the denomination of the recovery as
"damages" proves that the action was intended to be remedial
and not penal.9 3 The fact that the action is brought by the party
aggrieved and inures to his benefit has been regarded as signifi-
cant.9 4  Numerous judicial precedents based on other statutes
providing for double damages or a flat-sum recovery have been
relied on.95 It has been noted that the subsection is entitled
"Actions to Recover Damages" and bears a striking analogy to
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, serving the same
purpose in the fight against inflation as the double-damage pro-
vision thereof serves in the fight for fair wages9 6 Remark has
been made over the fact that the offense is not of such nature
91 Miller v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles. 22 Cal. (2d) 818, 142 P.
(2d) 297 (1943). The majority were unwilling to label the action as remedial in
character, but the dissenting judge vigorously insisted on expressing his views on
the matter: 22 Cal. (2d) 818 at 861, 142 P. (2d) 297 at 321-2.
92 See Schaubach v. Anderson, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,485 (Va. App., 1946),
and cases cited in notes 93 to 99, post.
93 Kaplan v. Arkellian, 21 N. J. Misc. 209, 32 A. (2d) 725 (1943).
94 Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131 N. J. L. 117, 35 A. (2d) 49 (1943).
95 Pratt v. Hollenbeck, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,735 (Pa. Com. Pleas, 1943),
contains the best collection of these authorities.
96 29 U. S. C. A. § 216(b). The liquidated damages recoverable thereunder have
been held not to be a penalty: Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S.
572, 62 S. Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942).
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that the executive could pardon, 7 for the action is not one cus-
tomarily brought in courts of misdemeanor for the collection of
penalties growing out of the violation of petty governmental
regulations.9 8 Even though small sums may be involved, treble
damages are regarded as remedial in fact as well as in law be-
cause the imposition thereof is "merely one way of attempting
to render full restitution to the injured party for the time, trouble
and delays usually attendant in enforcing his rights." 99  What-
ever the reason, treating the action as remedial leads to the de-
sired result, i.e. that the action may be maintained in the state
courts.'
It seems doubtful that the lengthy discussion of whether the
statute is penal or remedial has added much to the law, for a
number of courts have held that, regardless of the penal or
remedial character of the provision, they had jurisdiction over
treble damage actions.2  There is a simple rationale for this re-
sult. Section 205(e) specifically provides that the action may
be brought in "any court of competent jurisdiction," and the
meaning of this phrase has been definitely fixed, by decisions
under the Fair Labor Standards Act involving identical phrase-
ology,3 to include state as well as federal courts. 4  If anything
more is needed, the intent of Congress is apparent from Section
205(c) of the Price Control Act which says that the district
courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal proceedings and, con-
currently with state courts, of "all other proceedings" under
Section 205.' Since the existence of jurisdiction raises an impli-
97 Kaplan v. Arkellian, 21 N. J. Misc. 209, 32 A. (2d) 725 (1943).
98 Rutkiewicz v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1 C. C. H. Price Control
50,963 (Circuit Ct., Wis., 1943).
99 Pratt v. Hollenbeck, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,735 (Pa. Com. Pleas, 1943).
1 There may still be jurisdictional limitations, however, which must be ob-
served: Zuest v. Ingra, - N. J. L. -, 45 A. (2d) 810 (1946).
2 Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 38 A. (2d) 592 (1944); Lambros v.
Brown, - Md. -, 41 A. (2d) 78 (1945); Egling v. Lombardo, 181 Misc. 108, 43
N. Y. S. (2d) 358 (1943). In Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., - Ore. -, 164 P. (2d)
692 (1945), the Supreme Court of Oregon viewed the action as being one for a
penalty, but squarely ruled that, even so, the state courts possessed jurisdiction.
See also notes in 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 348 and 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 472.
a29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
4 See, for example, Cunningham v. Davis, 203 Ark. 982, 159 S. W. (2d) 751
(1942) ; Mengel Co. v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. (2d) 878 (1941).
5 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(c).
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cation of a duty to exercise it, 6 and since the federal statutes are
as much the law of a given state as the enactments of its own
legislature7 it is not necessary to determine whether the treble
damage action is penal or remedial for purposes of deciding
whether the state court has jurisdiction.
The issue as to whether the statute is penal rather than
remedial has become more pointed over the question as to whether
the cause of action survives the seller's death. Probably the best
argument for the penal character of the statute has been made
in this regard. The argument that it is penal stems basically
from the view that the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong
to the public, not to a particular individual, and that the con-
trolling purpose of Section 205(e) is to curb inflationary tenden-
cies by punishing violators, thereby deterring potential violators,
through forcing them to pay penalties to the Administrator or
to the ultimate consumer. The recovery, under this argument, is
a penalty for it sometimes goes to a third person instead of the
one directly injured and the sum exacted may be grossly dis-
proportionate to the actual injury sustained. It was the consid-
ered view of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Bowles v. Farmers National Bank of Lebanon, Kentucky,s
that the statute provided for a penalty, hence the action did not
survive the death of the one charged with the violation. 9 When
so holding, the court indicated that the fact that the sum was to
be recovered through a civil suit, as opposed to a criminal action,
did not determine the nature of the exaction.10 It also drew a
6 McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Railway Co., 292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, 78 L.
Ed. 1227 (1934) ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56
L. Ed. 327 (1912).
7 U. S. Const., Art. VI. Judicial decisions so holding as to the section in question
may be found in Miller v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. (2d)
818, 142 P. (2d) 297 (1943); Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 38 A. (2d)
592 (1944); Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Il. 284, 54 N. E. (2d)
210 (1944); Bowles v. Heckman, - Ind. -, 64 N. E. (2d) 660 (1946) ; Schaeffer
v. Leimberg, - Mass. -, 63 N. E. (2d) 193 (1945); Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131
N. J. L. 117, 35 A. (2d) 49 (1943). Contra: Robinson v. Norato, - R. I. -,
43 A. (2d) 467 (1945).
8147 F. (2d) 425 (1945).
9 The court held that, as the penalties had a federal source, the state statute
providing for survival of actions had no application: 147 F. (2d) 425 at 430.
10 The court cited Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 L.
Ed. 720, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 739 (1909) : United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475,
16 S. Ct. 641, 40 L. Ed. 777 (1896) ; Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, 14 S.
Ct. 163, 37 L. Ed. 1150 (1893).
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distinction between the case before it and Helvering v. Mitchell"
on the ground that, in the latter case, the government itself was
defrauded. As Congress had not expressly provided that the
treble damages or $50 recovered should be regarded as liquidated
damages, the court concluded that the intrinsic nature of the pro-
vision should control. Read in the light of the declared purpose
of the statute, i.e. to protect the public during the war emer-
gency,12 it decided the claim for damages represented a penalty
rather than compensation. The result is questionable, but it has
been followed by the Iowa Supreme Court in a five-to-four de-
cision.13
On the other hand, with virtually no discussion, a United
States District Court sitting in Pennsylvania had earlier held
exactly the opposite, namely, that the cause of action was reme-
dial, would survive the violator's death, and would leave his
estate liable for the amount recoverable.14  On the surface, it
would seem that these two courts used the nature of the action
as the means for dictating the conclusion and thereby arrived at
opposite results. Upon analysis, however, it is evident that the
law which was found to be controlling dictated the actual out-
come. The court in the last mentioned case regarded Pennsyl-
vania law as controlling, whereas the court in the other case
conceived itself bound by federal law. The real problem on this
issue, therefore, is one of conflict of laws, i.e. does state or fed-
eral law control. While, in all probability, the state law should
control, the weight of existing authority at the present moment
is that federal law controls and, in the absence of statute pro-
viding otherwise, common-law doctrines prevail so that the cause
of action does not survive the death of the violator.
Again, whether the treble damage action is remedial or penal
has been made the criterion for deciding whether a defendant
might claim a privilege against self-incrimination. 16 The results
11 303 U. S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938).
12 See 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 901.
18 Stevenson v. Stouffer, - Iowa -, 21 N. W. (2d) 287 (1946).
14 Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303 (1944).
15 See Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 20, § 772.
16 U. S. Const., Amend. V.
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here are likewise in direct conflict, for, when held to be remedial
the defendant has been denied any such privilege, 17 whereas when
held to be penal the claim of privilege has been sustained.' 8 The
first of these views seems to be the sounder, not because the action
is labelled "remedial," but because of basic distinctions between
civil suits as opposed to criminal prosecutions. The court which
granted the privilege seemed to be afraid that the information
elicited in the treble damage action would be subsequently used
in criminal proceedings. There is always this danger where the
same act gives rise to both civil and criminal liability, yet the
plaintiff is generally allowed to obtain information for his civil
action without reference to the Fifth Amendment, particularly
where, as here, there are impelling policy considerations. Al-
though the court which denied the claim of privilege used the
word "remedial," the same result would be reached if that word
were excised. The stress of Section 205(e) is obviously on civil
liability for money damages, as the treble damage section is
separated from that part of the statute which provides for crim-
inal prosecution. Rationalizing the solution by relying on the
basis of "penal" versus "remedial" doctrines is wholly unneces-
sary. The same basic principle underlies the holding that ad-
missions by an overcharging seller may be received in evidence
against him without prior proof of a corpus delicti.'9
In much the same way, the "penal" versus "remedial" test
affords no measure to determine the sum which a given defendant
must pay. One would think that if the statute were penal in char-
acter, the liability would be greater than if it were merely reme-
dial. But examination of the decisions reveals that there is no
relation at all between the amount of the judgment and the char-
acterization of the action. 20 If anything, where regarded as
17 Bowles v. Seitz, 62 F. Supp. 773 (1945) ; Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp. 94
18 Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (1945).
19 Bowles v. Hernandez, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,416 (Mun. Ct., Cal., 1945).
(1944).
20 For example, in Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944),
the action was treated as penal but thirty-one overcharges of fifty cents each
produced a recovery of only $50. In Thompson v. Taylor, 60 F. Supp. 395 (1945),
another "penal" case, a $7.45 overcharge for each of seven months led to the
recovery of $350. In contrast, compare Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303 (1944),
a "remedial" action based on a $7.00 overcharge for each of ten months which
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penal, the courts have tended to argue that cumulative penalties
are unwarranted so that a smaller judgment is likely to result.
It is a familiar doctrine that a penal statute should be strictly
construed while a remedial one should receive liberal construc-
tion. That doctrine has provided added incentive to use these
words for the sake of effect. There is frequent reference to the
"ipenal" or "remedial" character of the treble damage action
in opinions dealing with all kinds of problems thereunder, but
it is doubtful whether such arguments carry much weight. More
often than not they are just additional stones in the structure
rather than keystones which actually support the weight of the
decision, 21 for the opinions often go on to add that the act in
question should be given a reasonable construction in the light
of the purposes it was designed to accomplish.2
2
While the "penal" versus "remedial" analysis is one
method of reaching and justifying a result, it does not seem es-
sential or wise or insist upon such dichotomy. Not only do the
arguments based upon the purposes of the statute overlap in-
stead of being antithetical, but the words "penal" and "reme-
dial" fade still farther into insignificance when one finds declara-
tions that a statute may be punitory without being penal, 28 and
that, though the recovery is greater than the actual amount of
damage, the action is still remedial.24  Semantically, then, there
is no necessity for a complete dichotomy and, teleologically, the
necessity is far from clear. The fact is that the statute has both
penal and remedial characteristics. 25
produced a recovery of only $50, with Pratt v. Hollenbeck. 1 C. C. H. Price
Control 51,735 (Pa. Com. Pleas, 1943), also "remedial" In character, where
seventeen rental payments, each creating a cause of action for $50, resulted in a
total judgment for $850.
21 See Speten v. Bowles, 146 F. (2d) 602 (1945); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp.
787 (1944); Dunakin v. Southwestern Consumers Co-op Ass'n, 49 N. M. 69, 157
P. (2d) 243 (1945).
22 See, for example, Bowles v. Silverman, 57 F. Supp. 990 (1944).
23 Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131 N. J. L. 117, 35 A. (2d) 49 (1943).
24 Schaeffer v. Leimberg, - Mass. -, 63 N. E. (2d) 193 (1945).
25 It seems absurd to say that a tenant who pays a $1.00 overcharge each week
for thirty-eight weeks and who -recovers $l.900 is merely recovering damages:
Walsh v. Gurman, 132 Conn. 58, 42 A. (2d) 362 (1945), cert. den. sub nom. Gur-
man v. Illg, - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 24, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 35 (1945).. His action is
designed to, and does, penalize the landlord severely. On the other hand, par-
ticularly under the amended section, if the buyer merely recovers the amount
of the overcharge, it Is equally absurd to call the action "penal."
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Nor does it seem necessary to classify the Administrator's
action as wholly and exclusively penal, even conceding that very
respectable authority can be cited for the view that where the
government sues, and the money goes into the public treasury,
the action is merely a different form of punishment for an of-
fense against the state.28  If a given buyer's action would be
remedial in character even though seeking exemplary damages,
then suit by the Administrator if the buyer does not act is ob-
viously on the same plane. There is no difference in the purpose
or nature of the two actions; the recovery is identical in each;
both must be brought within a year, in contrast to the general
period of limitation provided for penal actions; and judgment
in either action bars suit by the other. Further indication that
they are the same is to be found in the fact that the same stand-
ards apply to both. The case of either need be proved by a mere
preponderance of the evidence; a verdict may be directed against
the defendant; a judgment on the pleadings may be rendered for
the plaintiff; and the losing party may appeal. Classifying the
one action as remedial and that of the other as penal seems un-
wise and unsound. The same law should be applied to both ac-
tions, for they are both penal as to the offender but remedial as
to the one injured.2 7  All things considered, it seems best to scrap
the "penal" versus "remedial" test for deciding cases. 28
Perhaps the best way to describe the action permitted by
Section 205(e) is to say that is a limited qui tam action. It is
not quite a typical qui tam action for it may be brought only by
a person who has himself been damaged rather than by an utter
stranger. It is closely analogous, however, for the penalty is
26 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. Ed. 239
(1888).
27 See note in 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 348, particularly pp. 351-2.
28 This conclusion is fortified by a comparison of numerous doctrinal rationaliza-
tions based on Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123
(1892), which is cited as precedent for construing the statute as remedial in
Dorsey v. Martin, 58 F. Supp. 722 (1945), but urged to prove that it is penal
in character in Bowles v. Farmers Nat. Bank of Lebanon, Ky., 147 F. (2d) 425
(1945). The Attrill case recognized the elastic character of the "penal" concept.
Transposing the concept into the varied situations arising under the Price Con-
trol Act, and giving extraordinary force to dictum in the Attrill case, appears to
be obfuscatory rather than clarifying. Wordy opinions may be both shortened
and improved by omitting it.
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designed to induce the person who has been overcharged to en-
force the law. Because of the discretion given to the trial courts
since the amendment of the statute, there is less chance that the
treble damage provision will provide a windfall for persons pos-
sessed of malevolent or disagreeable motives. In addition, the
elimination of the cumulative recovery feature removes the ob-
jectionable characteristics of true qui tam actions. Unless the
action is to be classed as sui generis, a singular remedy created
for an extraordinary situation, it may well be called a limited
qui tam action, but with emphasis on the word "limited." As
such, it should be treated as being neither exclusively penal nor
exclusively remedial and, as a consequence, a reasonable inter-
pretation, as distinguished from either a strict or a liberal one,
should be given to the statute.
VI. EXTENT OF THE SELLER'S LIABILITY
A. PRIOR TO AMENDMENT
Before the statute was amended, considerable conflict and
disagreement arose as to the extent of liability thereunder both
in respect to over-ceiling sales of personal property and over-
charge in rent cases. Nowhere do the innumerable problems of
price control come out stronger than in the attempt to clamp a
ceiling on countless items of personal property. Attempts to
tamper with what had previously been the unchallenged right of
a seller to dispose of his goods at whatever price he chose fairly
bristle with questions.
So far as sales of personal property were concerned, Sec-
tion 205(e) at first declared that the overcharged buyer was
privileged "to bring an action" for $50 or treble the amount of
the overcharge.2 9 From the outset, the Administrator contended
that the quoted words should be read as if they had been written
"the seller shall be liable." Clear and logical analysis, however,
demonstrates that the words simply meant "commence a suit."
There is no doubt that such is the ordinary, familiar and rea-
29 See 56 Stat. 34.
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sonable meaning thereof, so that if Congress had intended to
mean "shall be liable" it should have said so. To hold otherwise
would completely divest the courts of discretion and force them
to grind out automatic judgments in every case. Moreover, if
every shopkeeper had to forfeit $50 to each customer whom he
inadvertently and unintentionally overcharged a few cents, he
could unwittingly put himself out of business in a few minutes
by making a series of small overcharges. Without doubt, then,
the statute merely authorized the overcharged buyer to institute
legal proceedings and prescribed the maximum for which he
could sue.
Such was the reasoning in Hall v. Chaltis,30 where plaintiff
paid $2.50 for a pair of hose on which the ceiling price had been
lowered from $2.50 to $1.65 on the very day of the purchase.
Defendant had no notice nor reasonable opportunity of learning
of the change until three days after the sale, so plaintiff's re-
covery was limited to the exact amount of the overcharge. The
court expressed itself as being appalled at the idea that, if the
Administrator's interpretation was adopted, the doors of justice
would be firmly closed against any attempt to show that a given
defendant had had difficulty in interpreting and applying the
regulations ;31 had been entrapped by one having advance notice
of a price reduction; or had innocently made the overcharge with-
out notice of a lowered ceiling.
32
The reasoning of the Chaltis case was followed by the lower
court in Brown v. American Stores, Inc.,33 where plaintiff paid
fourteen cents for a can of soup on which the ceiling price was
ten cents. It did not appear whether plaintiff, having personally
3031 A. (2d) 699 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C., 1943).
3 The schedule there concerned included twenty-seven retail prices for various
types of stockings. Many schedules are even more intricate.
32 In a concurring opinion, Associate Judge Hood expressed the view that no
one should be held for violation of a revised price schedule unless he had a rea-
sonable opportunity to acquire notice of the change. Any other construction, he
indicated, would mean that Congress intended to treat alike those who had no
notice or opportunity to acquire notice, those who had the opportunity but neg-
lected to acquire notice, and those who, with actual notice, deliberately refused
to comply. As this would be an affront to justice, any argument that the damage
is done by the fact of overcharge, regardless of how it occurred, may serve as an
explanation for such view but is not a satisfactory justification for it.
23 32 A. (2d) 388 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C., 1943).
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selected the can from a shelf properly marked, realized at the
time that an overcharge was being made by the cashier or did
anything to call attention to the error. The can itself had been
inadvertently marked at the higher price by a clerk, but price
ceilings were properly posted, shelves had been properly marked,
and there was no evidence of an intent to violate the price regu-
lations. Plaintiff was permitted a recovery of $5.00 instead of
the $50.00 claimed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the statutory
words "bring an action for $50" meant "shall have a right to
recover $50.' '1 4 That court felt that Congress did not intend to
encourage purchasers to bring actions by holding out to them
the hope of reward of not less than $50 and at the same time
intend that such sum could be reduced at the discretion of a
court according to its individual judgment as to the proper
amount to be awarded. If good faith, inadvertence, or mitigating
circumstances of any kind were to be taken into consideration,
such intention should have been expressed in appropriate lan-
guage.3 5
After certiorari was denied, the American Stores case be-
came the leading authority in support of the proposition that a
minimum judgment of $50 was required whenever a violation was
proven. But the case has been challenged as conflicting in prin-
ciple with, though readily distinguishable from, the holding in
the case of Hecht Company v. Bowles3 6 It has also been sharply
criticized on the ground that a plaintiff should consider himself
fully compensated by an award sufficient, in the discretion of the
court, to recompense him for the inconvenience of prosecuting
the action.3 7 Tested by this standard, the original judgments in
the Chaltis and American Stores cases would be inadequate, but
34 Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F. (2d) 377 (1943), cert. den. 322 U. S.
730, 64 S. Ct. 947, 88 L. Ed. 1565 (1944).
35 The conference report, H. R. Rep. No. 1658, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 26, does
state that the statute permits an action for ". . . a minimum of $50 .... " The
dissenting opinion of Associate Judge Hood in Brown v. American Stores, 32 A.
(2d) 388 (1944), reads very much like an invocation to Congress to amend the
statute, as it reiterates the idea that it is for Congress, not the courts, to grant
or withhold power to exercise discretion.
36321 U. S. 321, 64 S. Ct. 587. 88 L. Ed. 754 (1944).
37 See note in 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 472 at 478.
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-it does not follow that the desired result could only be achieved
by awarding the maximum permissible penalty in all cases.
Despite this, the courts swung to the view that they had no
discretion, hence an award of at least $50 was mandatory re-
gardless of the seller's good faith s Support for this view was
said to rest in the fact that while the word "wilfully" is used in
Section 205(b) providing for criminal penalties, it is omitted
from Section 205(e), thereby evidencing an intention that the
presence or absence of good faith was to be immaterial. The
climax of this viewpoint was reached in Zwang v. A. & P. Food
Stores,3 9 where the court went so far as to say that it was no
defense (1) that plaintiff knew she was being charged a sum in
excess of the ceiling price as the doctrine of pari delicto had no
application, and (2) that, before the commencement of the civil
action, defendant's attention having been called to the improper
charge, it offered to return the excess above the ceiling price.
The familiar maxim de minimis non curat lex has also been held
inapplicable. 40
A few courts, however, have balked at such an interpretation,
feeling that it would make a racket out of law enforcement. 41 A
complaint based on a one-cent overcharge, for example, was dis-
missed when the evidence disclosed that the purchase was made
to secure proof of a violation rather than "for use and consump-
tion. '"42 Much the same rationale has been applied to preclude
recovery where the over-pricing had been inadvertently done by
an inexperienced and incompetent clerk and the plaintiff knew
of the over-price when he made the purchase but bought for the
38 Bowles v. Hasting, 146 F. (2d) 94 (1944); Bowles v. Franceschini. 145 F.
(2d) 510 (1944); Bowles v. Rock, 55 F. Supp. 865 (1944); Brown v. Cummins
Distilleries Corporation, 53 F. Supp. 659 (1944); Zwang v. A. & P. Food Stores.
181 Misc. 375, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1944) ; Egling v. Lombardo, 181 Misc. 108, 43
N. Y. S. (2d) 358 (1943). See also Sprecher, "Price Control Act-Recent Amend-
ments," 43 Mich. L. Rev. 188 at 201 (1944).
39 181 Misc. 375, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1944).
40 Kelly v. Gold, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 51,112 (Mun. Ct., Pa., 1943). But see
Childs v. Cruise, 1 C. C. H. Price Control 50,937 (Cal. Sup., 1943).
41 Peters v. Felber, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 1011, 152 P. (2d) 42 (1944).
42 Rutkiewicz v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1 C. C. H. Price Control
50,992 (Wis. Cty. Ct., 1943).
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purpose of bringing suit.1 3  Repeated purchases deliberately
made only with a view to enriching the purchasers at the expense
of businessmen have been criticized on the ground that Congress
did not intend to enlist the help of those who were really in pari
delicto.44  A realistic approach to the situation, particularly
where the seller deals in many thousands of articles, should lead
to no other result.45
As in the personal property cases, so in the rent cases diffi-
culty arose, but this time out of that part of Section 205(e) which
read: "For purposes of this section the payment or receipt of
rent for defense-area housing accommodations shall be deemed
the buying or selling of a commodity, as the case may be." By
the great weight of authority,46 the word "rent" was interpreted
to mean each separate payment made by a tenant to a landlord
at a specified time for the use of the landlord's premises, as
contra-distinguished from a single right to all the payments made
upon a series of occasions in return for a continuous estate con-
veyed by him. From this, the conclusion was drawn that each
separate receipt of rent in excess of ceiling was a separate "sell-
ing," giving rise to a separate statutory liability. When these
successive liabilities were added together, the tenant sometimes
recovered a substantial sum for a trivial overpayment, as where
43 Dunakin v. Southwestern Consumers Co-op Ass'n, 49 N. M. 69, 157 P. (2d)
243 (1945).
44 Tropp v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 21 N. J. Misc. 205. 32 A. (2d) 717
(1943). In Lane v. Fitzsimmons Stores, 62 F. Supp. 89 (1945), the plaintiff
visited about two thousand grocery stores and about seven hundred fruit and
vegetable stands. He made 261 overceiling purchases at a total expenditure of
$48.91. He was overcharged $4.48, and asked for over $10,000 damages (221
times $50). He claimed to be a "consumer" within the Act because he and his
family had eaten the food purchased. Recovery was denied on the theory that
Section 205(e) was not applicable to this self-appointed "private policeman."
The court said: "There is such a thing as the Courts needing to keep themselves
respectable."
45 Even prior to amendment of the statute, the court in Aronwald v. Sperber,
49 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (1944), mitigated the effect of the general doctrine as be-
tween the same buyer and seller, by limiting recovery to one penalty per schedule
even though several isolated sales were proven covering numerous items under
different price schedules. In lilgreen v. Sherman's Cleaners & Tailors, - N. C.
-, 36 S. E. (2d) 252 (1945), overcharges aggregating thirty-five cents on five
items were held to justify not five $50 penalties but only one since only one price
schedule was Involved.
46 A footnote to Gilbert v. Thierry, in 58 F. Supp. 235 at 239, note 4, collects a
large number of cases on both sides of the problem.
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a judgment for $1,900 was granted based on a $1.00 overpayment
for each of thirty-eight weeks.
47
That this interpretation worked an unwarranted hardship in
some instances is well exemplified by Gilbert v. Thierry.48 There,
the landlord innocently and without intent to deceive reported
that the premises included a refrigerator supplied by him. When
his tenant moved, he bought a refrigerator from her and leased
the premises to a new tenant at a monthly rental $5.00 greater
than the ceiling rental. On his attention being called to the over-
charge by the Office of Price Administration, he tendered to the
new tenant a check for the amount of the overcharges. The
check was not cashed. Subsequently, on suit by the tenant, the
landlord was held liable for the stated penalty of $50 for each
of the nine months that the overcharge had been made despite
clear evidence that the landlord had acted innocently and without
intent to violate the rent regulation. The landlord's argument
that the transaction was a unitary single sale of a single estate,
analogous to an installment sale of an automobile to be paid for
in several installments, so that the successive overpayments gave
rise to either one $50 recovery or for treble the amount of the
overcharge, was rejected.
It can be argued that Congress meant to impose no greater
liability than $50 or treble the overcharge, for the Senate Com-
mittee's report had stated that Section 205(e) was designed to
"discourage initial violations.'' 49 If the word "initial" is re-
strictive, i.e. the penalty attaches only for the first violation, it
makes good sense as the tenant, knowing that he could collect $50
for the initial violation, would sue right away to get that sum
and thereby have the rent reduced to ceiling level. If not, it
would be hard to endow the word "initial" with any meaning,
and would allow a sharp tenant to capitalize on his landlord's
mistake, thereby enriching himself unconscionably without ma-
terially aiding the country in the battle against inflation. To
47Walsh v. Gurman, 132 Conn. 58, 42 A. (2d) 362 (1945), cert. den. sub nom.
Gurman v. Ilg, - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 24, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 35 (1945).
4858 F. Supp. 235 (1945), affirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945).
49 Sen. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong, 2d Sess., p. 8. Italics added.
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interpret the section so as to hold out such great rewards for
minor, unintentional overcharges served only to foster in tenants
a desire to promote price violations rather than to put a stop to
them, with the result that Section 205(e) operated to defeat
rather than further its purpose.50
But a literal, rigorous, and technical interpretation of the
statute prior to its amendment undoubtedly led to the conclusion
reached in the Thierry case. If the impact of the statute was
upon each separate receipt of rent, as opposed to the sale of a
single item of personal property where the sale was the impor-
tant thing rather than the separate receipt of parts of the pur-
chase price, then a separate penalty for each excessive rent pay-
ment was properly recoverable. The strongest contention against
this view lies in the fact that the clause relating to rent payments
was intended to tell what should create liability,51 rather than to
tell the extent of the liability.52  If that clause had not been in-
cluded, there could have been no treble damage action for an
overpayment of rent, so there should be no sound basis for dis-
tinguishing between "sales" of real and personal property.
There are practical reasons, however, to substantiate the
conclusion that each rental payment creates a separate liability
in that in a term lease there would be doubt as to when the cause
of action accrued and when it expired if the transaction consti-
tuted one selling.53 It seems very unlikely that Congress intended
that the offense should not be complete until the expiration of the
tenancy when all the rent had been paid, for, if the lease extended
beyond the life of the statute, to make the lease and the total
payment of rent the basis of the action would render the statute
wholly inoperative. Nor is it likely that the making of the first
payment should warrant the imposition of a penalty equal to
treble the amount of the aggregate of the overcharges likely to
accrue during the entire period of the lease for, obviously, there
would have been no "payment" as to the accruing rent and, on
50 See Peters v. Felber, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 1011, 152 P. (2d) 42 (1944).
51 It is apparent that the right to occupy premises is not a "commodity" ex-
cept for the purposes of this statute, so the payment and receipt of rent therefor
would not generally be regarded as a "sale."
52 See a suggestion to this effect in McCowen v. Dumont, 54 F. Supp. 749 (1944).
53 Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1945), affirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945).
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the slightest threat of suit, the landlord would reduce the rent
to the ceiling level. 54  It would seem, then, that a cause of action
should accrue as each successive rental payment was made, and
the liability thereon expire one year later. The first action for
the first overpayment would not exhaust the statutory sanction,
but it is not clear whether the remainder of the sanction consists
of simply waiting until the aggregate of the overcharges exceeds
one-third of $5055 or whether each additional overceiling rent
payment creates an additional $50 liability.56 The latter appears
to be the prevailing view of the proper construction of the un-
amended statute.
Several courts refused to interpret Section 205(e) in that
manner, being moved, no doubt, by a desire to avoid unneces-
sarily oppressive penalties. Congress, they felt, could easily have
included the words "for each violation" had it meant that con-
sequence to attach.57  Moreover, if a lease is to be regarded as
a conveyance, or a month-to-month tenancy as an implied con-
veyance, then it could well be argued that the fact that several
excessive rental payments were made would be immaterial for
there would be only one "selling" of a single "commodity."
While this view is in the distinct minority at the moment, it
might grow under the amended statute.
The New York courts, as usual, went their own individual
ways. Some ruled that the treble damage provision was penal,
should be strictly construed, and did not provide for cumulative
penalties, on the theory that it would take plain and unambiguous
language to warrant cumulative penalties.58  One court even
54This argument is expanded in Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 38 A.
(2d) 592 (1944).
55 A particularly clear holding to this effect is Brooks v. Kalisiewicz, 58 F. Supp.
648 (1945).
56 Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1945), affirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945),
contains the best reasoning for this view.
57 This is the ratio decidendi of Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46 N. Y. 8. (2d)
54 (1944). Carried to the nth extreme, the penalty based on a case where there
was an overcharge of daily rental for a year would be 365 times $50 or $18,250.
58 Gordon v. Hochberg, 182 Misc. 117, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 957 (1944); Aronwald
v. Sperber, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (1944); Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46
N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944). Contra: Grzybicki v. Friedman, 269 App. Div. 308, 56
N. Y. S. (2d) 65 (1945); Cha-Kir Realty Corporation v. Sanchez, 183 Misc. 427,
52 N. Y. S. (2d) 482 (1944) ; Kerr v. Congel, 181 Misc. 461, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 932
(1944).
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pushed this doctrine so far as to refuse to add treble damages
for several rental payments, awarding only $50 for the initial
overcharge plus the amount of the overcharges in each succeed-
ing month not trebled.59 This is a clearly erroneous interpreta-
tion of the statute, runs counter to an earlier correct interpre-
tation,60 and is manifestly opposed to the plain language of un-
amended Section 205(e) which specified that if the excessive
charge was made the basis of computation then treble that amount
should be the measure of recovery. A subsequent ruling by the
Appellate Term in New York adopted the prevailing view, based
on the argument that to hold otherwise would encourage every
initial violator to repeat his transgression with the assurance
that, in any event, he would be made to respond in damages for
only one violation.6 Earlier views, including the one that the
fact that there were many overceiling payments was immaterial
because only one schedule was violated, were thereby repudi-
ated.62
By way of conclusion to this discussion of the unamended
statute, there is room for doubt that Congress intended to impose
a cumulative $50 penalty for each receipt of rent. But the door
was left open, by the words of the statute, for such an interpre-
tation, and most courts entered through it.
B. UNDER THE AMENDED SECTION
Conflicting views as to the proper construction of the original
section and a desire to distinguish between the innocent act of a
bewildered citizen and the intentional overcharging of a shame-
less profiteer, developed pressure for an amendment of the
59 McGlover v. Kingswood Management, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 737 (1945).
60 Kerr v. Congel, 181 Misc. 461, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 932 (1944).
61 Grzybicki v. Friedman, 269 App. Div. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 65 (1945).
62 The opinion in Grzybicki v. Friedman, cited in the preceding note, is well and
comprehensively reasoned. The authorities are well chosen, especially Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), for the propo-
sition that penalties may be cumulative, and Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Elec-
tric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 63 S. Ct. 172, 87 L. Ed. 165 (1942), for the view that state
law and policy must yield to the federal view in construing a federal statute.
The opinion is subject to criticism, however, for an additional reason urged, . c.
that Congress intended a cumulative civil penalty for the reason that it subse-
quently said so, is contra-canonical.
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statute. Congress did change the statute in this respect so that
it now reads:
In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus which-
ever of the following sums is greater: (1) Such amount not
more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the
overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in
its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than
$25 nor more than $50, as the court in its discretion may
determine: Provided, however, That such amount shall be
the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or $25, which-
ever is greater, if the defendant proves that the violation of
the regulation, order, or price schedule was neither wilfull
nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions
against the occurrence of the violation. 3
As amended, the statute now makes distinction possible, even if
only to a limited degree, so the present section comports more
nearly with the average American's sense of justice. The door
which the court, in Hall v. Chaltis,64 feared would be shut has
once more been opened and it is now possible to get away from
a system of mechanical jurisprudence in which there was no
chance of adapting the recovery to the factual situation. Com-
parisons as to the relative mental astuteness of the litigants
which the courts indulged in,65 notwithstanding there was no pro-
vision in the unamended section justifying it, are now permissible
factors to be considered.66
The effect of the amended statute on pending litigation was
dealt with by enacting that:
insofar as it relates to actions by buyers or actions which
63 50 U. S. C. A. App. §925(e).
6431 A. (2d) 699 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C., 1943).
65 See Dunakin v. Southwestern Consumers Co-op Ass'n, 49 N. M. 69, 157 P.
(2d) 243 (1945), and cases there cited.
66 The ambiguity heretofore noted that had been created by the words "bring
an action" has been eliminated by the substitution of the words "shall be liable"
in 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925(e). Precedent as to the use of the same words in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A. § 216(b), and the construction
thereof laid down in Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62
S. Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942), to the effect that such words possess
mandatory effect, now settles the correct interpretation to be applied in the
future.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
may be brought by the Administrator only after the buyer
has failed to institute an action within thirty days from the
occurrence of the violation, shall be applicable only with re-
spect to violations occurring after the date of this Act. In
other cases, such amendment shall be applicable with respect
to proceedings pending on the date of enactment of this Act
and with respect to proceedings instituted thereafter.67
Rights of action which had previously accrued did not abate,68
but remained unaffected so they could go forward without any
change, except that the defendants in actions brought by the
Administrator, concerning purchases made in the course of trade
or business, were afforded the opportunity to avail themselves of
the proviso.69 Existing appeals from final judgments favoring
the Administrator were placed in the category of "pending"
proceedings.70  It should be noted, however, that actions by buy-
ers, based on violations occurring prior to June 30, 1944, are not
affected as the amendment does not apply to them,71 it being
limited to violations occurring after that date.72
1. The Rent Cases
The problem of the cumulative or non-cumulative nature of
the $50 liability for rental payments does not seem to be en-
tirely removed by the amendment. One writer concludes that
the amendment "does not in any way reduce the ambiguity of
the original provision,'' 7 3 and therefore still favors recovery for
each rental overpayment except as it may be reduced to $25 in
the case of a non-wilfull overcharge. The Senate Report on the
67 See historical note appended to 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 925.
6 SBowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (1945).
69Bowles v. Franceschini, 145 F. (2d) 510 (1944).
7OBowles v. Sharp, 149 F. (2d) 148 (1945); Speten v. Bowles, 146 F. (2d)
602 (1945); Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (1945); Bowles
v. Hasting, 146 F. (2d) 94 (1944); Bowles v. Franceschini, 145 F. (2d) 510
(1944). But see Augustine v. Bowles, 149 F. (2d) 93 (1945).
71 Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1945), affirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945);
Walsh v. Gurman. 132 Conn. 58, 42 A. (2d) 362 (1945); Schloegel v. Yesso, (La.
App.) 21 So. (2d) 393 (1945) ; Desper v. Warner Holding Co., 219 Minn. 607, 19
N. W. (2d) 62 (1945).
72 Scalia v. Goldfarb, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 950 (1945).
73 See note in 93 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 220 commenting on Everly v. Zepp, 57 F.
Supp. 303 (1944).
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amended act does not bear out that view for it states that the
bill was designed to amend the law with respect to the damages
which might be recovered so as to provide that the purchaser
could recover only one $50 penalty for all of the overcharges
which he had paid to a given seller prior to the bringing of the
suit.7 4  Similar statements appear in the House Report 75 as well
as in the Conference Report.76  This legislative background
would clearly seem to establish that it was the intent of Congress
to subject the offender to a civil liability for each violation but
to require the plaintiff either to bring successive actions for each
violation as it occurs or else use one action embracing all past
violations.77 There is dicta in the case of Bowles v. Milner Hotels,
Inc.,78 to the effect that successive overcharges against the same
tenant are not cumulative although it was there held that the
Administrator might recover, in a single action, for each viola-
tion against a different tenant because the Administrator has a
separate remedy for each tenant overcharged. 79
As the statutory provision directs that a judgment against
the same seller shall bar any recovery based on overcharges
made to the same purchaser prior to the institution of the action
in which such judgment is rendered, unless a landlord is foolish
enough to continue his overcharges after being sued and held
liable therefor, separate minimum judgments for each overcharge
are prohibited.
74 Sen. Rep. No. 922, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 13. It cites, as an example of the
thing to be avoided, the case of a roomer paying rent by the day who is over-
charged fifty cents a day for ten days and thereby becomes entitled to recover
$500 even though the aggregate amount of the overcharge is only $5.
75 Report of House Committee on Banking and Currency, No. 1593, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 8.
76 See H. R. No. 1698, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 23.
77 In such action, whether for one or more violations, plaintiff's maximum re-
covery is limited to three times the overcharge or $50, whichever is greater. If
the overcharge is proved to have been non-wilful and not the result of failure to
take practicable precautions, the maximum liability is the greater of the over-
charges or $25. See Kalwar v. McKinnon, 152 F. (2d) 263 (1945) ; Grzybicki v.
Friedman, 269 App. Div. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 65 (1945).
7862 F. Supp. 493 (1945).
79 Each of the seventy-four tenants there concerned could have maintained a
separate suit and recovered $25.00 each. The Administrator, after the expiration
of thirty days, could have done likewise. The fact that the Administrator chose
to combine all seventy-four claims in one suit should not change the measure of
recovery. While an $1850 recovery for overcharges totalling $45.00 sounds harsh.
the case is technically sound in law.
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2. Operation of the Proviso
The present proviso was passed for the benefit and protec-
tion of the defendant-seller, but it does not come into play auto-
matically nor is it a cure-all. He must plead the facts entitling
him to the benefit of the proviso by way of answer to the com-
plaint and prove his pleading, for the burden rests squarely on
him and not on the plaintiff.8 0 Moreover, he must prove both
things, to-wit: (1) that the violation was not wilfull; and (2)
that it was not the result of failure to take practicable precau-
tions against its occurrence; for proof of one without the other
is not sufficient. 8 ' Even if the burden is sustained, the defense
does not preclude all recovery, 2 for an award of some damages
is still mandatory and the court cannot withhold a judgment for
the plaintiff in some amount.8 3 As a partial defense, it may cut
down the amount of the recovery, but it is not a cure-all for the
"innocent" seller is, to some extent, required to do more than
merely refund the overcharge. In one case, for example, there
was uncontroverted testimony that, before the transaction was
consummated, the seller communicated with the local office of
Price Administration in an effort to ascertain the maximum price
but was informed that the applicable price schedule had not been
received. The sale was consummated with the understanding
that if the price paid should thereafter be found to be in excess
of the schedule then the excess would be refunded. A refund was
duly made in accordance with such understanding, but the seller
was nonetheless held liable for the amount of the overcharge.8 4
The injustice of such a holding makes one shudder, but it strik-
ingly dramatizes the fact that the proviso does not afford com-
plete immunity even to the non-wilfull violator.
so Bowles v. Krodel. 149 F. (2d) 398 (1945): Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co.,
146 F. (2d) 566 (1945) ; Bowles v. Superior Packing Co., 63 F. Supp. 12 (1945).
81 See Bowles v. Hasting, 146 F. (2d) 94 (1944) ; Bowles v. Franceschini. 145 F.
(2d) 510 (1944), as well as cases cited in the preceding footnote. See also 90 Cong.
Rec. 6449.
82 Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F. (2d) 597 (1945), cert. den. - U. S. -,
66 S. Ct. 484, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 842 (1945) ; Bowles v. Hall, 62 F. Supp. 486 (1945).
83 Bowles v. Hasting, 146 F. (2d) 92 (1944) ; Bowles v. Hall, 62 F. Supp. 486
(1945).
84 Bowles v. Hall, 62 F. Supp. 486 (1945). See also Trachtman v. Samit, 62 F.
Supp. 176 (1945).
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Both "wilfull" and "practicable precautions" are slippery
terms; their boundaries are vague and indefinite. Although both
are bound to be strongly colored by the factual situations which
call for their interpretation, the former is more a term of law
than the latter, hence legal precedent may be of some help in
interpreting it. On the one hand, it has been construed to mean
"deliberate, knowing, intentional," as distinguished from "malev-
olent, with evil intent or purpose. " 5 In Bowles v. Krasno Bros.
Glove & Mitten Company,s8 for example, a defendant acted under
a misapprehension as to the correct interpretation of a regula-
tion, consequently did nothing to change fts sales practices or
avoid what was, in fact, a violation, but was nonetheless held
liable for treble damages.
Akin to this view, though less stringent, is the interpretation
of "wilfull" as meaning "obstinate" in contrast to "accidental."
A particularly clear illustration of this interpretation is to be
found in Bowles v. Ammon8 7 where defendant claimed that cer-
tain engines which it manufactured were properly under one price
regulation although the Administrator asserted they were cov-
ered by another, so had a lower ceiling price. While fully aware
of the Administrator's position, defendant persisted in following
the course indicated by its own views and was adjudged to be
acting wilfully and forced to pay full treble damages. That case
also illustrates the interrelationship between the absence of wil-
fullness and the taking of "practicable precautions," for the
court rested its decision as much on the latter as on the former.
It appeared that, both before and after the violation, defendant
was notified in writing to observe the lower ceiling price, but
simply disagreed with the Administrator without having even so
much as the advice of counsel to rely on.
Conflicting sharply with these views is the holding of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case
of Rainbow Dyeing & Cleaning Company v. Bowles.85 The defend-
85 Bowles v. Batson, 61 F. Supp. 839 (1945) ; Bowles v. Ammon, 61 F. Supp. 106
(1945). Its use in criminal proceedings is discussed in Zimberg v. United States,
142 F. (2d) 132 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 712, 65 S. Ct. 38, 89 L. Ed. 573 (1944).
86 59 F. Supp. 581 (1945).
87 61 F. Supp. 106 (1945).
88150 F. (2d) 273 (1945).
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ant there had actual notice of the Administrator's official inter-
pretation of the regulation in question, but nonetheless refused to
concede that its price changes had been in violation of the Act or
that the later official interpretation was consistent with the regu-
lation. Its violation was clearly deliberate, intentional, knowing,
and obstinate within the meaning of the other cases. On motion
to vacate the judgment, however, the court recognized that the
regulation was capable of being honestly and reasonably under-
stood as defendant had understood it, and concluded that if
defendant, after taking all "practicable precautions" to under-
stand the regulation, "honestly disagreed with . . . the Adminis-
trator's interpretation, and acted in accordance with [its] different
interpretation in order that the question might be judicially
decided, appellant was not a 'wilfull' violator of the Regula-
tion."9 It should be noted, in weighing the import of this case,
that the decision was (1) preceded by the cautionary statement
that the court could not anticipate the evidence; (2) that the case
was remanded, not finally decided; (3) that the regulation con-
cerned was ambiguous; and (4) that an OPA inspector had told
defendant, after it had increased its prices and before it got the
official interpretation, that its increases were lawful.90 Whoever
reads Justice Arnold's dissent at the original hearing91 cannot
fail to be impressed with the multiplicity and confusing character
of the "official interpretations" of the ambiguous regulation, hence
would approve his conclusion that ambiguities should be construed
in favor of persons who attempt in good faith to comply with the
regulations.
It would appear, under this view, that there is emerging a
"good faith" concept as the legal equivalent of a lack of wilfull-
ness and the taking of proper practicable precautions, such good
faith being sustained if there appears to be an honest and reason-
able interpretation of the regulation. Conversely, a lack of good
faith would be equivalent to wilfullness as well as a failure to take
89 150 F. (2d) 273 at 279.
90 Even though the defendant did not suggest that its action was influenced by
such advice or that the inspector had power to bind the OPA, this last fact colored
the situation favorably to defendant.
91 150 F. (2d) 273 at 276-9, particularly pp. 276-7.
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practicable precautions. 2 If lack of good faith is to be the only
basis for imposing treble damages, a defendant would have a less
heavy burden of proof in order to bring himself within the proviso
than that imposed by the other cases mentioned. So, in Smith v.
Lodge,93 a landlord escaped paying treble damages by establishing
non-wilfulness through evidence showing that the overcharges
were "being held in escrow" pending a determination of the
proper rent by the Area Rent Director.
It could be anticipated that the Administrator would bitterly
contest such relaxation, and he has done so by asserting his posi-
tion to be that no one could honestly and reasonably believe that
a regulation meant one thing when the author of that regulation
had formally and officially declared that it possessed an opposite
meaning.94 According to him, the word "wilfull" includes deliber-
ately unlawful conduct even when engaged in under a claim of
right,95 as he not only wants his regulations to be the law but
also favors endowing his interpretations thereof with divine sig-
nificance.
It would seem risky, however, for a defendant to rest his
defense on the fact that he honestly believed a regulation meant
something different from the official interpretation where he admits
knowing what that interpretation is. What he "honestly" believes
is largely subjective, so he ought to be fairly sure that the regula-
tion is "reasonably" capable of being understood as he interprets
it. It would be better, perhaps, to rely on the advice of counsel
92 That view is echoed in Bowles v. Jung, 57 F. Supp. 701 (1944), and in Duffy v.
Howell, 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,518 (Cal. Super., 1945).
93 3 C. C. H. Price Control 52,411 (Tenn. App., 1945). See also Kalwar v.
McKinnon, 152 F. (2d) 263 (1945).
94 That declaration binds the Administrator without doubt: American Teleph. &
Teleg. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 57 S. Ct. 170, 81 L. Ed. 142 (1936). It
possesses at least persuasive force: Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S.
410, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945) ; Consolidated Water Power & Paper Co.
v. Bowles, 146 F. (2d) 492 (1944) ; Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 144 F. (2d)
741 (1944) ; Goodman v. Bowles, 138 F. (2d) 917 (1943).
5 Reliance upon cases like Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56,
28 S. Ct. 428, 52 L. Ed. 681 (1908) ; Arrow Distilleries v. Alexander, 109 F. (2d)
397 (1940); Townsend v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 353 (1938); and Chicago,
St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry. v. United States, 162 F. 835 (1908), is not especially persua-
sive as it is difficult to reconcile those cases with Spies v. United States, 317 U. S.
492, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418 (1943); California v. Latimer, 305 U. S. 255, 58
S. Ct. 1036, 83 L. Ed. 159 (1938); and United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389,
54 S. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381 (1933).
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obtained prior to the violation or as soon as a doubt arose, for
there is a strong intimation in the Ammon case that this would
take the violation out of the "wilfull" category.96 Such advice
may also serve as a sufficient "practicable precaution," although
the ultimate in that direction would be a suit for a declaratory
judgment to determine the meaning of a regulation, provided such
suit is not brought for the purpose of anticipating an enforcement
action. A written interpretation by the OPA together with a price
adjustment in accordance therewith or in reliance thereon would
also serve. 97  While unofficial advice by subordinate officials of
the OPA, whether oral 98 or written,9  is not to be relied upon as a
complete and unquestionably satisfactory defense, it may be rele-
vant and material on the question of wilfullness.1 Other facts
which undoubtedly will be weighed concern the number and com-
plexity of the regulations or amendments; the character, reputa-
tion and capacity of the defendant; the extent of the overcharges;
and any objective considerations bearing upon the defendant's
intent.2
It is neither simple nor wise to try to block out and delimit
96 In Bowles v. Villari, 61 F. Supp. 784 (1945), the considered opinion of counsel,
after consultation with various governmental officials, that the proposed plan as
to the formation of a co-operative was valid and would not violate price regula-
tions, was held to be a mitigating factor so that defendants were liable only for
the amount of the overcharge and not for treble damages.
97 Bowles v. Jung, 57 F. Supp. 701 (1944), indicates that if a seller is told by an
OPA representative that his prices are correct and sells on that basis before he has
been advised to the contrary, he is free from both wilfullness and failure to take
practicable precautions.
98 Schreffler v. Bowles, 153 F. (2d) 1 (1946) ; Wells Lamont Corp. v. Bowles, 149
F. (2d) 364 (1945).
99Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F. (2d) 597 (1945), cert. den. - U. S.
-, 66 S. Ct. 484, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 842 (1945).
1 In Bowles v. Hansen Packing Co., 64 F. Supp. 131 (1946), at 134-5, the court
stated: "It is true, as the Administrator contends, that he has many hundreds of
employees. Nevertheless they are his .employees. He can give each of them as
little or as much authority as he desires. He has the right to control absolutely
their conduct and if he permits them or any of them to give oral advice or in-
formation, he is then in no position to penalize a citizen because that citizen acted
upon such advice, if it is afterwards determined to be erroneous. Had the defend-
ant here followed procedural regulation No. 1 and gotten the same interpretation of
the regulation it would then have been official and would have protected the de-
fendant against any judgment of any kind in this action in the event the interpre-
tation was erroneous, and the action were brought. The oral advice received is no
defense to the defendant here against recovery for the actual amount of the over-
charge, but neither can it be used for the purpose of penalizing the defendant
because it accepted it as correct, and in good faith acted upon it."
2 Bowles v. Jung, 57 F. Supp. 701 (1944) ; Bowles v. Primrose Petroleum Co., 2
C. C. H. Price Control 52,207 (D. C., Tex., 1944).
THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTION
what is meant by the phrase "practicable precautions," for they
will vary with each particular case. The expression undoubtedly
encompasses all types of precautions which a reasonably prudent
business man should maintain to safeguard his business against
price violations.3 Senator Chandler, author of the proviso defense,
[ias said that reading the regulations to employees and trying to
icquaint them with the regulations would be significant. 4 It may
be gathered from judicial dictum or implication that care in the
selection of employees, providing them with proper instructions,
astablishing a system for their guidance in selling commodities at
eiling prices, and taking disciplinary action against employees
round ignoring instructions, will be regarded as reasonable and
practicable precautions. 5 There is, of course, positive advantage
in establishing that the overcharge was neither wilfull nor the
result of a failure to take practicable precautions as then it is
mandatory upon the court to award not more than the amount of
Lhe overcharge or $25, whichever is the greater.6
3. Measure of Damage
Where the seller is found to have wilfully violated the regula-
Lion, schedule, or order, and thereby violated the statute, the first
problem concerns the least amount the court may allow the plain-
liff to recover. Taken literally, there is no floor at all in the first
part of the section, but under the reasoning of Bowles v. American
Stores, Inc.,7 as well as from a reasonable interpretation of the
section, it is obvious that the amount assessed may never be less
Lhan $25, even if the overcharge is only one cent. This lack of a
floor in the amended section has produced the criticism that the
act is a "dismal failure" in respect to prescribing limits on a
court's discretion. It is no doubt true, taken literally, that the
section could lead to ridiculous results. For example, if there
3 Bowles v. Superior Packing Co., 2 C. C. H. Price Control 152,322 (D. C., Minn.,
[945).
4 90 Cong. Rec. 5473.
5 Bowles v. Goebel, 58 F. Supp. 68M (1945), affirmed in 151 F. (2d) 671 (1945).
6 See Bowles v. Krodel, 149 F. (2d) 398 (1945).
7139 F. (2d) 377 (1943), cert. den. 322 U. S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 947, 88 L. Ed. 1565
(1944).
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was a wilfull $1,000 overcharge the court would have discretion
to enter judgment for as little as $25, whereas if the violation was
not wilfull the judgment would have to be for at least the amount
of the overcharge. That cannot be what the section really means.
To avoid an anomalous result, it has been construed so that the
first alternative, to-wit: "Such amount not more than three times
the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges . . . as the
court in its discretion may determine," contains the implicit
qualification that the lower limit of the court's discretion is the
amount of the overcharge itself.8 That construction is supported
by legislative history for the House Conferees' report read:
"Under the first clause the buyer of the commodity would be
entitled, of course, to recover a minimum of the overcharge, or
the overcharges, for which the action is brought."" Senator
Wagner, Chairman of the Senate Conferees, in his report likewise
said: "The minimum limits of" the range are the amount of the
overcharge or $25, whichever is the greater. ' 10
Beyond this, there is little agreement as to how the section
should be construed. The Administrator divides the situations
under the section into two classes, contending (1) that when the
seller fails to prove that his violation was not wilfull or deliberate,
he is liable for the full statutory maximum, being three times the
amount of the overcharge or $50, whichever is greater; and (2)
that when the seller proves that the violation was not wilfull or
deliberate, but fails to prove that he had taken practicable pre-
cautions against its occurrence, then his liability is to be deter-
mined on the basis of the degree of his fault or culpability.1' For
this interpretation, he relies upon the past history of the section,
both judicial1 2 and legislative.13  While the original Act, as con-
strued, made it mandatory upon the court, regardless of the cir-
8 Bowles v. Heinel Motors. 59 F. Supp. 759 (1945) ; Bowles v. Goebel. 58 F. Snpp.
686 (1945), affirmed in 151 F. (2d) 671 (1945). See also Sprecher, "Price Control
Act-Recent Amendments," 43 Mich. L. Rev. 188 (1944), at p. 202.
0 H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 23.
10 90 Cong. Rec. 6449.
11 Bowles v. Krodel, 149 F. (2d) 398 (1945).
12 Particularly Bowles v. Franceschini, 145 F. (2d) 510 (1944), and Bowles v.
American Stores, 139 F. (2d) 377 (1943).
13 See remarks by various senators in 90 Cong. Rec. pp. 5380, 5469, 5473, 5531,
5537 and 5543. See also Sen. Rep. 922, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14.
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cumstances of the case, to allow judgment for whichever was the
greater of $50 or treble the amount of the overcharges, the very
purpose of the amendment was to change the Act. Prior con-
structions, therefore, should have little, if any, persuasive effect
on how the present section is to be construed.14  One is more
inclined to agree with the conclusion reached in Bowles v. Krodel5
that the only thing disclosed with any degree of certainty by the
legislative history is that Congress intended to relieve the courts
of the mandatory duty previously imposed upon them and to vest
them with a discretion as to the amount of the judgment within
the minimum and maximum amounts provided.
Some courts have adopted the Administrator's interpretation
of the amended statute. In Bowles v. LaCoste,16 for example, the
seller had not bothered to ascertain the correct maximum selling
price for a truck though he knew the regulation was in effect. He
was held to have wilfully violated the regulation and was com-
pelled to pay three times the amount by which the consideration
exceeded the ceiling. The seller in Bowles v. Miller 17 failed to
sustain the burden imposed on him by the proviso, so he was made
to pay treble damages. Even partial rescission has been held
insufficient to wipe out liability pro tanto.ls
Other courts, however, have squarely rejected that interpreta-
tion. One court vested complete discretion in the fact-finding
body, the jury, where the facts of violation, wilfulness, and suffi-
ciency of practicable precautions were all in issue.' 9 Another
held that the minimum amount of the judgment in a wilfull vio-
lation case was the amount of the overcharge. 20 The judgment
there was rendered on the seller's default, so no evidence what-
14 It is doubtful whether statements of individual lawmakers and general debates,
as distinguished from the reports, may be used to interpret the instant section:
Bowles v. Krodel. 149 F. (2d) 398 (1945). Even if they were, most of the Admin-
istrator's references relate to statements made with respect to the proviso defense
and its effect, so they are hardly applicable.
15149 F. (2d) 398 (1945).
16 2 C. C. H. Price Control 52,208 (Ohio Mun. Ct., 1945).
17 247 Wis. 139, 19 N. W. (2d) 285 (1945).
15 Bowles v. Leventhal, 61 F. Supp. 144 (1945). See also Bowles v. Sharp, 149
F. (2d) 148 (1945), and Bowles v. Krasno Bros. Glove & Mitten Co., 59 F. Supp.
581 (1945).
19 Bowles v. Goebel, 58 F. Supp. 686 (1945), affirmed in 151 F. (2d) 671 (1945).
2OBowles v. Krodel, 149 F. (2d) 398 (1945).
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ever was offered by the defendant. Under the Administrator's
interpretation, the judgment in that situation should have been
for at least treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded
the ceiling price. Certainly, the seller should not be in a more
favorable position where he offers no exculpatory evidence than
he is where he offers such evidence but fails to sustain the burden.
Although the court agreed with this, it refused to adopt the "novel
and untenable theory, both as a matter of construction and pro-
cedure," that a defendant-seller should be in a better position
where he attempts but fails to establish the proviso defense than
he is where he introduces no exculpatory evidence whatever. That
ruling seems to be clearly wrong for it indicates that in all cases,
except where the proviso defense is established, the court is lodged
with an absolutely unfettered discretion to enter any judgment it
pleases provided it is for not less than $25 and not more than
three times the amount of the overcharges. 21
The dissenting opinion in that case takes still a different posi-
tion, one lying between these two extremes. It rests upon the
proposition that the discretion given the court is only a sound
judicial discretion to be exercised in accordance with the large
objectives of the Act, so that where it appears that the defendant
has been informed, before the sale, of the lawful maximum price
and has thereafter deliberately sold for a price substantially in
excess, his flagrant violation of the law prevents the trial court,
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, from permitting him
to get off by merely repaying the amount of the overcharge.
This view is not identical with the Administrator's view. If,
for example, a defendant-seller introduced considerable evidence
in the nature of excuse but which failed to establish either non-
wilfulness or sufficient practicable precautions, the court might,
21 That Is the only possible conclusion that can be drawn, for there was no evi-
dence whatever from which the trial court could have found that there were miti-
gating circumstances. The opinion states that: "The Administrator makes no
contention that the violation was wilful or that the court abused its discretion in
allowink a judgment only for the amount of the overcharge." That statement is
incorrect as the Administrator's brief urged that when there is a total absence of
any showing of any mitigating circumstance discretion is abused and error com-
mitted unless the liability is fixed at the full statutory maximum. Contrary to the
impression one would get from reading the opinion, the scope of discretion was in
Issue.
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in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, assess the damage at,
say, twice the amount of the overcharge whereas, under the
Administrator's interpretation, the defendant would have to pay
treble damages. Under the view of the majority opinion, he might
be let off for merely the exact amount of the overcharge. If
choice between the differences contained in the three interpreta-
tions is possible, the preferable view would be that liability should
be fixed by the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. That choice
may not offer the administrative ease of the rigidly formalized
rules set by the Administrator's interpretation, nor permit the
court to exercise uncontrolled discretion, but it is certainly more
equitable, is designed to effectuate the purposes of the statute,
and should be and is gradually coming to be adopted. 22 Under
that view the court should hear evidence relative to the circum-
stances of the violation in all cases, whether the defendant relies
upon the proviso defense or not. If he does, the circumstances
are directly in issue. If not, the court should hear such evidence
for the purpose of properly exercising its discretion.
On the point as to the amount of proof required to establish
damage, there is indication that the plaintiff is not required to
prove the exact amount of damages to a certainty but need offer
only some reasonable basis for calculating the amount thereof,
particularly where the defendant has possession of the invoices
and fails to produce them.2s
4. Allowance of Attorney's Fees
Section 205(e) makes it mandatory that the successful plain-
tiff be permitted to recover reasonable attorney's fees. Failure
to submit proof of the value of such services is not fatal to the
recovery thereof,24 and the court will allow them even though the
attorney is requested to submit an itemized schedule of time spent
22 Bowles v. Goebel, 151 F. (2d) 671 (1945) ; Bowles v. Batson, 61 F. Supp. 839
(1945) ; Bowles v. Superior Packing Co., 2 C. C. H. Price Control 52,322 (D. Minn.,
1945).
23 Bowles v. Lentin, 151 F. (2d) 615 (1945).
24 Aronwald v. Sperber, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 352 (1945).
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and does not do so. 25  The attorney should, however, choose a
forum which has jurisdiction to fix a fee. 26
The extent of the allowance lies in the discretion of the court
for the section says only that it is to be "reasonable." Courts
have generally tended to fix a small fee so as not to render such
litigation profitable, but at the same time recognizing a minimum
commensurate with the necessity of the litigation to protect the
client's rights. 27 One court, however, has pushed this doctrine so
far as to limit the amount of the fee to a sum far below the
admitted worth of the services rendered. 2s It should be sharply
criticized for such a ruling inasmuch as it is the contemplation of
the statute to provide the attorney with fair compensation. "Rea-
sonable" does not mean cheap; it means compensatory. That is
the interpretation which has been placed on a substantially simi-
lar section contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 so that,
granting there are rather wide limits on what might be regarded
as reasonable, when the court expressly states that the services
are obviously worth more, it ought to compensate the attorney in
terms of what they are worth.
In a few cases, the attorney's fee has exceeded the amount of
the recovery;3° in some, it has equalled it.31  In most cases, how-
25 Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1944), affrmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945).
26 In Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N. C. 617, 27 S. E. (2d) 644 (1943), suit brought
before a justice of the peace was dismissed because, under the constitution and
statutes of that state, the justice of the peace was without power to award attor-
ney's fees.
27 Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303 (1944).
2s Whatley v. Love, (La. App.) 13 So. (2d) 719 (1943).
29 29 U. S. C. A. § 216(b). See Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.. 52 F. Supp. 503
(1943), affirmed sub nom. North Shore Corp. v. Scott, 143 F. (2d) 595 (1944);
Hargrave v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 42 F. Supp. 908 (1941), affirmed in
129 F. (2d) 655 (1942) ; Corey v. Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (1943);
Greenberg v. Arsenal Building Corp.. 50 F. Supp. 700 (1943): Lewis v. Nailling,
36 F. Supp. 187 (1940) ; Sykes v. Lochmann, 156 Kan. 223, 132 P. (2d) 620 (1943),
cert. den. 319 U. S. 753, 63 S. Ct. 1165, 87 L. Ed. 1707 (1943).
30 Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944), affirmed after
reduction in attorney's fees in 268 App. Div. 814, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 336 (1944). The
recovery was for $50, but the final attorney's fees allowed were $150. See also
Tradeftman v. Samit, 62 F. Supp. 176 (1945) ; Stotts v. Ohler. 1 C. C. H. Price
Control 51,104 (Colo. City Ct., 1944) ; and Hayes v. Osborn, 2 C. C. H. Price Con-
trol 52,296 (Okla., 1945).
-1 Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303 (1944).
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ever, it is smaller. 32 The amount of the recovery should not nec-
essarily control the amount of the fee, although it will undoubtedly
have a strong tendency to influence it. One wise practice, adopted
by some trial courts, is to make the award without prejudice to
the right to apply for additional counsel fees if an appeal is
taken. 33
VII. CONCLUSION
The Emergency Price Control Act and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder together make up a novel program to guard
against wartime price increases and inflation. Being of such
compass as to include the entire economic life of the nation, the
program required not only patriotism and good will but also vigi-
lant enforcement. If the Administrator alone was obliged to
enforce it, his staff would necessarily have had to be of enormous
size. Even though aided by a large number of public-spirited
volunteers, his staff was still inadequate to enforce compliance by
injunctive decree or criminal prosecution. The additional sanc-
tion of the treble damage action provided by Section 205(e) has,
therefore, served at least two primary purposes, namely, to induce
consumers to sue sellers if they were overcharged, yet permitting
the Administrator to recover if they did not.
It may be significant to note, in measuring the success of the
law, that the total amount officially collected in one year for viola-
tions of the Act aggregated more than one-half of the actual cost
of investigation and litigation.3 4 From a fiscal standpoint, there-
fore, the action has proved a success and has far surpassed any
prior use of the exemplary damage technique of enforcement.3 5
32 Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1944), affirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945),
recovery $450, fee $75; Whatley v. Love, (La. App.) 13 So. (2d) 719 (1943), re-
covery $50, fee $25; Kurland v. Bukspan, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 135 (1945), recovery
$171, fee $150; Aronwald v. Sperber, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 352 (1945), recovery $100,
fee $50; Kerr v. Congel, 181 Misc. 461, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944), recovery $360,
fee $60.
33 Gilbert v. Thierry. 58 F. Supp. 235 (1944), allirmed in 147 F. (2d) 603 (1945);
Aronwald v. Sperber, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 352 (1945).
34 H. R. Rep. 1660, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 152.
35 Basis for comparison with the success attained under the Fair Labor Standards
Act may be found in Ginsburg, "The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic
Authority and Sanctions," 9 Law & Cont. Prob. 22 (1942), at p. 56, note 139.
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While the treble damage device is not new, 36 it has never
before been employed on such a scale. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that its use in connection with the price control program has
been productive of substantial legal controversy. Much of that
controversy is now allayed. But, as has already been noted, the
amended section is still lacking in clarity on some points, so that,
should the occasion ever again arise to place comparable legisla-
tion on the books, the framers thereof could well improve on the
existing statute.
36 Familiar prior examples are to be found in the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 15; the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. A. § 15; the patent law, 35 U. S. C. A. § 67; and
the law protecting trade names, 15 U. S. C. A. § 96.
